The War for Truth

I recently attended a forum titled "Malign Foreign Influence in Philippine Politics," which sought to dissect a term called Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, or FIMI — a term increasingly finding its way into diplomatic briefings, intelligence assessments, and newsroom conversations worldwide.

The War for Truth: In today’s Philippines, the battle for sovereignty is no longer fought only at sea, but across screens, feeds, and the contested terrain of public perception. [Illustrator: ASK]

In the Philippine context, what's alarming is that this term no longer lives at the fringe of public discourse.

According to the speakers assembled that day, FIMI is now operating dangerously and in full force across our country’s digital ecosystem — shaping how Filipinos consume information, interpret geopolitical events, and perhaps, eventually, how they vote.

The morning’s keynote speaker, Rear Admiral Jay Tarriela, spokesperson of the Philippine Coast Guard, wasted little time in reframing what many mistakenly assume is isolated to a maritime security discussion.

“The greatest challenge we face today is not water cannons, dangerous maneuvers, or foreign vessels,” he said. “The greatest challenge is misinformation and fake news.”

For a nation that has spent the better part of the past three years watching increasingly tense encounters in the West Philippine Sea, the statement landed with force.

Radical Transparency

Tarriela amplified that while ships, lasers, and water cannons may dominate headlines, the more consequential battlefield now exists on smartphones, newsfeeds, and algorithm-driven social media platforms, where narratives compete for legitimacy.

Rear Admiral Tarriela highlighted that in an age of information warfare, every video released and every fact documented becomes an act of strategic defense. [Photo: Jay Tarriela]

If falsehoods are allowed to shape public understanding, he warned, truth itself becomes negotiable. And once truth becomes negotiable, sovereignty may follow.

For that reason, he explained, the Philippine Coast Guard has embraced what he described as “radical transparency,” a strategy that includes releasing video evidence of maritime confrontations in near real time, publishing incident reports quickly, and documenting coercive actions before alternative narratives can take root.

Transparency, Tarriela stressed, is no longer simply public communication. It is deterrence.

He pointed to what he described as a more aggressive diplomatic posture from China in 2026, marked by faster rebuttals, sharper public messaging, and increasingly coordinated responses from Chinese diplomatic channels.

In his view, this was not random escalation.

“Transparency is working, and Beijing knows it,” he told the audience.

Perhaps his most politically charged observation came when he suggested that information operations may already be shaping the environment for the Philippines’ 2028 presidential elections.

“They are already preparing the information battlefield for the 2028 presidential election,” he warned.

Tarriela’s office, he revealed further, had analyzed hundreds of social media posts from official diplomatic channels over recent months, identifying what he described as a deliberate blend of soft-power messaging, legalistic rebuttals, and what he called “divide and rule, executed in real time on social media.”

Interconnected Channels

If Tarriela’s presentation focused on the operational front lines of information warfare, the second speaker, Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong (ret.), formerly of the Philippine Navy and now Professor of Praxis at the Ateneo School of Government (ASOG), zoomed out to examine the broader strategic architecture.

Ong explained that foreign interference cannot be understood solely through viral videos, bot networks, or manipulated hashtags.

Disinformation, he said, is only one visible layer of a much broader campaign of political warfare.

According to Ong, foreign influence often moves through three interconnected channels: economic coercion, political influence operations, and information warfare.

This brings to light China's recent strategic investments across the region that include an array of infrastructure projects, scholarship programs, sister-city agreements, friendship clubs, Confucian-think tanks, state-sponsored forums plus tours, and local political partnerships (remember Alice Guo) that may appear benign in isolation. However, when viewed through a geopolitical lens, they can form an ecosystem of influence designed to shape how nations think, decide, and align themselves.

“The objective is not physical invasion,” Ong said. “The objective is influence.”

Bringing the information war into the open, CirroLytix and UA&P Law, through the Indo-Pacific Media Resilience initiative, convened a timely conversation on truth, trust, and democratic resilience. [Image: CirroLytix]

The Philippines, he explained, sits at the geographic center of one of the world’s most contested strategic corridors, linking the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the wider Indo-Pacific.

That location makes it valuable not just militarily, but politically. If a foreign power cannot secure a friendly Philippines, Ong warned, neutralizing or destabilizing the country may become the next best alternative.

What makes such influence campaigns especially effective, he noted, is that democratic societies often provide the very openness that hostile actors seek to exploit.

Disinformation Economy

The morning’s final speaker, Regine Cabato, an award-winning freelance journalist and poet who has reported extensively on the subject, brought the conversation down to street level — into the world of influencers, troll farms, and the monetization of Beijing’s messaging.

“The Philippines has gained notoriety as patient zero for disinformation,” she said.

Long before foreign influence became a mainstream national security concern, Cabato explained, the Philippines had already built a thriving domestic disinformation industry composed of political influencers-for-hire, covert digital marketers, troll farms, and content operators.

“Disinformation is not just politics,” she said. “Disinformation is a business.”

She cited research suggesting that the country’s disinformation economy may be worth as much as ₱1 billion during election cycles, with digital operators paid to manufacture trends, attack opponents, and shape public perception.

That existing infrastructure, she warned, creates fertile ground for foreign actors.

They do not need to build influence networks from scratch. They simply plug into an already functioning ecosystem.

Cabato described modern influence operations as “cyborg operations,” where human influencers, bots, algorithms, AI-generated content, and coordinated social media amplification work together to manufacture what appears to be authentic grassroots sentiment.

She presented investigative findings showing how some political influencers echoed narratives aligned with Chinese state messaging, amplified anti-government content, and, in some cases, appeared to move in synchrony with diplomatic rebuttals posted online.

“You may not be able to prove the money,” she said, “but you can analyze the narratives.”

By the time the forum drew to a close, one message had become difficult to ignore.

“Patient Zero for Disinformation” — Regine Cabato shines a light on a shadow economy where online influence, outrage, and narrative control have become a billion-peso business. [Photo: GSU]

FIMI is no longer an abstract academic concept, nor merely a talking point reserved for defense briefings or newsroom investigations. It is a live contest unfolding inside the phones, conversations, classrooms, workplaces, and communities of ordinary Filipinos.

And so, the battle for Philippine sovereignty will no longer begin at sea.

It begins with what Filipinos choose to believe.

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