Russian Security Elite May Unseat Putin If Economy Worsens, War Drags On

The Ukraine war started with Putin holding a televised security council meeting in which he humiliated Sergei Naryshkin, chief of the foreign intelligence service, for lack of enthusiasm about the invasion.

Photo Insert: Vladimir Putin has been President of Russia since 2012, and previously from 2000 until 2008.

Putin later placed two generals of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) under house arrest and began an inquiry into bad intelligence and misuse of funds to cultivate pro-Kremlin groups in Ukraine. He also forced a deputy commander of the National Guard to quit. In April, one of the FSB generals placed under house arrest was transferred to Lefortovo prison.

Last month, amid rumors that Putin was furious with the progress of the invasion, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the public face of the war and regarded as a most trusted Putin ally, disappeared from view. When Shoigu finally resurfaced, he appeared somber and withdrawn.

On April 9, Putin reorganized the military chain of command, appointing General Alexandr V. Dvornikov to be in charge of the operations in Ukraine, Russian journalists and analysts Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan wrote for the Foreign Affairs newsletter.

These developments suggest siloviki, as Russia’s security elite are known and had been one of the main power centers of Putin’s regime, may be losing influence and favor from Putin, a former KGB officer himself. Given Putin’s crackdown on these men and the growing awareness in Moscow that the war has gone badly, some observers ask how long they will tolerate his mistakes, Soldatov and Borogan said.

The last time the Russian army launched an open rebellion was in 1825, when the Decembrists tried to dethrone Tsar Nicolas I. The Russian military has not become an alternative center of power—in the mold of Egypt’s Free Officers, for example, who toppled King Farouk in 1952.

Although Putin has long counted on the support of his military and security services, the war in Ukraine suggests there may be limits to how far this can go. The visible tensions between him and senior members of siloviki suggest that Putin may be more paranoid than ever about challenges to his rule.

Such discord also indicates that at least some members of his inner circle are displeased with him. And since Putin’s chosen way of dealing with problems is to blame the siloviki, they are not encouraged to give him an accurate picture about the war.

But the siloviki are ruthless in protecting their own interests, and there is one way, at least, that they might lose faith: If Russia’s economic troubles reach the point that its regional governors begin to break ranks with Putin and the economic order begins to collapse, then the siloviki may well conclude that the Kremlin is losing control of the country and that their own future is threatened. In that case, they could step aside and let it happen—or even provide a hand.

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